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Abstract—This paper studies physical consequences of unob-
servable false data injection (FDI) attacks designed only with
information inside a sub-network of the power system. The goal
of this attack is to overload a chosen target line without being
detected via measurements. To overcome the limited information,
a multiple linear regression model is developed to learn the
relationship between the external network and the attack sub-
network from historical data. The worst possible consequences of
such FDI attacks are evaluated by solving a bi-level optimization
problem wherein the first level models the limited attack re-
sources, while the second level formulates the system response to
such attacks via DC optimal power flow (OPF). The attack model
with limited information is reflected in the DC OPF formulation
that only takes into account the system information for the attack
sub-network. The vulnerability of this attack model is illustrated
on the IEEE 24-bus RTS and IEEE 118-bus systems.
Index Terms—Cyber-physical system, Cyber-security, false
data injection attacks, state estimation, multiple linear regression,
bi-level optimization.
NOMENCLATURE
Topologies
E the area outside L, where the attacker has no
knowledge, i.e., E = G \ L;
G the entire network of the test system;
L a sub-network of G bounded by load buses where
the attacker has perfect knowledge inside it;
S a sub-graph of G bounded by load buses where
the attacker may replace measurements inside it.
The characters G, S, L, and E also represent the sets of buses
inside the corresponding networks.
Sets
B the set of boundary buses in L such that each bus
in B is connected to at least one bus in E ;
C the set of lines in G that are congested for each
instance of the historical data, where C+ and C−
are the subsets in C for which the power flow
directions are positive and negative, respectively;
EM the set of buses with marginal generators in E ;
Gi the set of generators that are connected to bus i;
I the set of internal buses, i.e., I = L \ B;
Wi the set of lines that are connected to boundary
bus i, where WLi and WEi are the subsets of lines
located in L and E , respectively;
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Y the subset of remaining buses in E , i.e., Y = E\Z;
Z the subset of buses in E , for which power injec-
tions remain constant in the historical data.
Quantities & Indices
l target line index;
nb number of buses in G;
nbr number of lines in G;
nc number of lines in C;
ng number of generators in G;
nz number of measurements in G;
nB, nL, nE ,
nY
number of buses in sets B, L, E , and Y , respec-
tively.
Parameters
A,B the (nc + 1)× nL and (nc + 1)× nY coefficient
matrices associated with vL and vY in (35), re-
spectively, i.e., A = [KLC ;1
T ] and B = [KYC ;1
T ];
Cg(·) the quadratic cost function for generator g;
d the constant vector in (35) such that d =
[SPC,max −KZC vZ ;−1T vZ ];
G the nb × ng generator-to-bus connectivity matrix
in G;
H the nb × nb dependency matrix between power
injection measurements and state variables in G;
I identical matrix;
Ji the 1× nb row vector of the sum of row vectors
in K corresponding to lines in WEi , i.e., Ji =∑
k∈WEi
Kk;
K the nbr × nb power transfer distribution factor
(PTDF) matrix in G;
M a large constant;
N0 the l0-norm constraint limit;
N1 the l1-norm constraint limit;
Pmax the nbr × 1 thermal limit vector in G;
PD the nb × 1 real power load vector in G;
PG,max,
PG,min
the ng × 1 maximum and minimum generation
limit vectors, respectively, in G;
S a nc×nc diagonal matrix with Skk = 1, ∀k ∈ C+,
and Skk = −1, ∀k ∈ C−;
Γ the nbr × nb dependency matrix between power
flow measurements and voltage angle states in G;
λi the locational marginal price (LMP) at boundary
bus i;
τ the load shift factor;
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ζ the weight of the norm of attack vector c.
Variables
c the nb × 1 attack vector in G;
e the nz × 1 vector of measurement noise in G;
P the nbr × 1 vector of branch power flow in G;
P ubl the upper bound of the physical power flow on
target line l resulting from attack vector c¯∗;
PG the ng × 1 vector of generation dispatch variable
in G;
P¯I,i, P¯I,B the pseudo-boundary injection variable at bound-
ary bus i, and the nB× 1 pseudo-boundary injec-
tion vector of all boundary buses, respectively;
u the nb × 1 slack vector to linearize the l1-norm
constraint;
v the nb × 1 vector of power injections in G;
x the nb × 1 vector of state variables in G;
z the nz × 1 vector of measurements in G;
δ the vector of binary variables for dual variables
in the bi-level attack optimization problem.
Multiple Linear Regression Parameters
xt the input vector at time instance t, i.e., xTt =
G¯P¯G,t − P¯D,t;
X the input matrix including input vectors for t =
1, 2, . . . ,m;
yi the observed output vector at boundary bus i for
t = 1, 2, . . . ,m, i.e.,, yi,t = P¯I,i,t;
εi,t the random error at boundary bus i at time in-
stance t;
Fˆi, fˆi,0 [Fˆi, fˆi,0] is the estimated regression coefficient
vector with input matrix X and output vector yi,
i.e., [Fˆi, fˆi,0]T =
(
XTX
)−1
XTyi.
For any vector or matrix associated with the entire network
G such as c,G,H,K, P, PG, PD, and Γ, we write the equiv-
alent parameters corresponding to the sub-network L with
c¯, G¯, H¯, K¯, P¯ , P¯G, P¯D, and Γ¯, respectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE electric power system is monitored via an extensivenetwork of sensors in tandem with data processing algo-
rithms, i.e., an intelligent cyber layer, that enables continual
observation and control of the physical system. In recent
years, several incidents [1]–[4] demonstrate that the cyber
layer of power system is vulnerable to cyber-attacks that
impact the system operation status and lead to serious physical
consequences. Therefore, it is crucial to fully understand the
potential consequences of such attacks.
There is an overall need to understand the effects of cyber-
attacks against power systems. Doing so requires considering
different categories of attacks, and which of them are credible
and could lead to severe consequences. Fig. 1 illustrates our
view of the space of cyber-attacks. Within the space of all
cyber-attacks, we choose to focus on false data injection (FDI)
attacks in which the attacker replaces a subset of measure-
ments with counterfeits. The most effective FDI attacks are
those which are unobservable to state estimation (SE). An
unobservable FDI attack is one for which the measurements
look like they originated from legitimate state values but are
in fact spoofed by the attacker. Thus, such an attack cannot be
detected as noisy measurements by bad data detector. It has
been established in [5]–[7] that FDI attacks can bypass both
DC SE and AC SE when designed appropriately. Such attacks
can be designed to specifically have an impact on electricity
markets (e.g., [8], [9]) via a bi-level optimization problem
wherein the first level problem models the attacker’s goal and
the second level problem models the system response.
However, this did not address whether credible FDI at-
tacks can be constructed that would actually lead to severe
consequences. Our goal is to understand this question. The
earlier work of [10] and [11] focused on the question of severe
consequences: can an unobservable FDI attack cause not only
a spoofed state estimator but also physical consequences? The
answer was yes, in principle, by causing a control center
to incorrectly dispatch, which would in turn cause a line
overflow. Such attacks, similar to those in [8] and [9], can
also be designed via a bi-level optimization problem. This
attack optimization problem requires the attacker to know
system-wide information including topology, generation cost
and capacity, and load data. In practice, obtaining all the
required information can be difficult for the attacker. In order
to ensure that the worst-case attacks in [8]–[11] are credible,
we focus on understanding whether it is possible at all to
design FDI attacks with only limited system information in
this paper. Recently, [12]–[14] have demonstrated that it is
possible to design FDI attacks against SE with inaccurate or
limited topology information. However, physical consequences
of the worst-case limited information FDI attacks have not
been analyzed.
Cyber Attacks
Unobservable 
FDI Attacks
Perfect 
Information 
Attacks
Limited 
Information 
Attacks
FDI Attacks
FDI Attacks Leading to 
Severe Consequences 
Limited Information FDI Attacks Leading to Severe Consequences
Fig. 1. The space of cyber-attacks.
In this paper, we assume the attacker only has access to
information inside an attack sub-network and absolutely no
knowledge of the outside network. In order to overcome the
limited information, we suppose that the attacker infiltrates
the sub-network long before it executes its attack, so that it
can observe the natural behavior of the system in order to
predict the effect of an attack. In particular, we assume that the
attacker has access to historical data inside the sub-network
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that includes loads, costs, capacities, status, and dispatches
of generators, and locational marginal prices. Historical data
is sometimes directly utilized as pseudo-measurements to SE
when the real-time information is incomplete. However, the
attacker can be more sophisticated and use historical data to
create higher fidelity boundary pseudo-measurements when
they only have limited information. In this work, we suppose
that the attacker uses multiple linear regression method to learn
the relationship between the external network and the attack
sub-network from historical data. Furthermore, we predict the
response of the control center under such attacks in a local
sub-network via a bi-level optimization problem.
The limited information attack problem is similar to the
"seamless" market problem [15] which aims to achieve max-
imum social welfare across several adjacent markets, while
allowing each market to model its own system, exchanging
boundary information with its neighbors. In order to predict
the behavior of the adjacent market, in [15], [16], linear regres-
sion model is used. However, in contrast to the market problem
that requires perfect prediction of the external network, the
attacker only needs partial prediction to overload a target line.
In this paper, we demonstrate that even if the prediction of the
external network re-dispatch is inaccurate, the attacker can still
cause overflow on the target line.
This paper builds upon our prior work [17], where we
consider limited information such that the attacker can learn
system parameters perfectly inside a sub-network and imper-
fectly outside of the sub-network. In [17], we demonstrate that
such attacks can result in line overflows with both accurate and
inaccurate information outside of the attack sub-network.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) We introduce a method to compute power flows inside
the attack sub-network with only localized information by
approximating the external effects via pseudo-boundary
injections. We develop a multiple linear regression model,
allowing the attacker to learn the relationship between
pseudo-boundary injections and power injections in the
sub-network from historical data.
2) We introduce a bi-level optimization problem from the
attacker’s perspective to maximize the power flow on a
target line wherein the first level models attacker’s limited
resources and the second level models system response
via a modified DC OPF. Such DC OPF formulation only
takes into account localized information and the pseudo-
boundary injections. From the perspective of the system,
this bi-level optimization problem can also be employed
as the vulnerability analysis to evaluate the sub-graph that
are prone to be attacked.
3) We take the equivalent constraints that satisfy all his-
torical data into account to prove the existence of a
linear relationship between pseudo-boundary injections
and power injections inside the attack sub-network for
certain topologies. Note that the linear relationship here
is different from the Ward [?] or Monticelli [?] network
equivalent which is derived from a specific power flow
case. Furthermore, we show that even if the attacker
cannot exactly predict the physical consequences, it can
compute an upper bound on the power flow of the target
line.
4) We demonstrate that an attacker can cause line overflows
in the IEEE 24-bus RTS system and IEEE 118-bus system
using this bi-level attack optimization problem.
The paper is organized as follows. The system and attack
models are introduced in Sec. II. Prior work on perfect
information FDI attack is reviewed in Sec. III. The limited
information attack model is presented in Sec. IV. Justifications
for the proposed attack strategy is given in Sec. V, followed
by numerical results in Sec. VI and conclusions in Sec. VII.
II. SYSTEM AND ATTACK MODELS
In this section, we introduce the mathematical formulation
for SE, unobservable FDI attacks, and OPF. Throughout, we
assume there are nb buses, nbr lines, ng generators, and nz
measurements in the system. We assume that the system uses
DC SE, and DC OPF. The topology of the entire power system
is denoted by G.
A. Measurement Model and State Estimation
The DC measurement model can be written as
z = Hx+ e (1)
where z is the nz × 1 measurement vector; x is the nb × 1
voltage angle state vector; H denotes the nz×nb dependency
matrix between measurements and states; e is the nz×1 mea-
surement error vector assumed to be composed of independent
Gaussian random variables.
We use weighted least-squares (WLS) to solve this problem
[18]. Subsequent to SE, a bad data detector uses χ2-test to
detect and eliminate noisy measurements.
B. Unobservable FDI Attack Model
In an unobservable FDI attack, the attacker aims to mali-
ciously change the system states from x to x+c without being
being detected by bad data detector. In the absence of noise,
the measurements after such attacks, za, satisfy
za = z +Hc = H (x+ c) (2)
where c is the nb × 1 attack vector.
C. Optimal Power Flow
The DC OPF problem aims to minimize the total costs
of all generators subject to power balance, thermal limits,
and generation limits constraints. The formulation of OPF is
described in detail in Sec. III-A.
III. PRIOR WORK: PERFECT KNOWLEDGE FDI ATTACKS
In this section, we briefly review a closely related work [10]
on unobservable FDI attacks assuming an attacker with perfect
knowledge. As in [10], we distinguish between two types
of buses in the network: load buses that have load directly
connected to that bus, and non-load buses with no load. The
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knowledge (denoted K1) and capabilities (denoted C1) of the
attacker in [10] is described below:
K1. The attacker has knowledge of (i) the complete network
topology; (ii) the cost, capacity, and operational status of
all generators in the system; and (iii) historical load data
of the entire network.
C1. The attacker may choose a small area S, which is a sub-
graph of the entire network G, i.e., a sub-network chosen
in certain manner (see below for description) and bounded
by load buses. The attacker may replace measurements
inside S .
A. Attack Design with Perfect Information
In [10], a bi-level optimization problem is introduced to
find the FDI attack that maximizes the power flow on a
chosen target line. In [10], the authors use B-θ method to
formulate the second level DC OPF, in which the power flow
vector is computed as a linear function of voltage angle, θ.
In contrast, in this paper we equivalently formulate the DC
OPF using PTDF, where the line power flow is calculated as
the product of PTDF matrix and power injection. The bi-level
attack optimization problem is as follows:
maximize
c,P
Pl − ζ ‖c‖0 (3)
subject to
P = K(GP ∗G − PD) (4)
‖c‖0 ≤ N0 (5)
− τPD ≤ Hc ≤ τPD (6)
{P ∗G} = arg
{
minimize
PG
ng∑
g=1
Cg (PGg)
}
(7)
subject to
ng∑
g=1
PGg =
nb∑
i=1
PDi (8)
− Pmax ≤ K(GPG − PD +Hc) ≤ Pmax (9)
PG,min ≤ PG ≤ PG,max (10)
where P is a nbr × 1 vector of power flow with thermal limit
as Pmax, PG is the ng × 1 active power generation vector
with maximum and minimum limits as PG,max and PG,min,
respectively; G is the nb × ng generator-to-bus connectivity
matrix; Cg(·) is the quadratic cost function for generator g;
K is the nbr × nb power transfer distribution factor (PTDF)
matrix; H is the nb × nb dependency matrix between power
injection measurements and state variables; PD is the nb × 1
real power load vector; τ is the load shift factor which
represents the percentage that the cyber load (computed with
the spoofed measurements) differs from the physical load; N0
is the l0-norm constraint limit; and ζ is the weight of the norm
of attack vector c.
The objective of the optimal attack problem is to maximize
the power flow on the target line l while changing as few
states as possible. In the first level, the attack vector is chosen
subject to the l0-norm constraint of the attack vector in (5),
i.e., the number of non-zero elements in the attack vector c,
and the load shift limitation in (6). In the second level, the
system response to the attack determined in the first level
is modeled via DC OPF in (7)−(10), where the objective in
(7) is to minimize the the total costs of all generators and
constraints (8)−(10) represent power balance, thermal limits,
and generation limits. Note that the power injection vector in
(9) is changed from (GPG − PD) to (GPG − PD + Hc) by
the attacker.
The bi-level optimization problem introduced above is non-
linear and non-convex. For tractability, several constraints are
modified to convert the original formulation into an equivalent
mixed-integer linear program (MILP). The modifications in-
clude: (a) relaxing the l0-norm constraint in (5) to an l1-norm
constraint with limit N1 and linearizing it by introducing a
slack vector u; (b) replacing the second level DC OPF problem
by its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions; and
(c) linearizing the complementary slackness conditions in
KKT by introducing a new vector δ of binary variables for
dual variables and a large constant M .
B. Attack Implementation
Once the attack vector c is determined, the attacker can
identify the buses with state changes to enable the attack, i.e.,
the buses corresponding to non-zero entries of c. We refer to
these buses as center buses. The attack sub-graph S includes
all center buses as well as the lines and buses connecting to
every center bus. The non-center buses connected to a center
bus are all load buses. This method ensures that nothing is
changed outside the attack sub-graph S while the changes
needed at the non-center buses are presented as load changes.
Given attacker’s knowledge K1 and capabilities C1, the
authors in [10] introduce the FDI attacks as follows:
zai =
{
zi ,
zi +Hic ,
i /∈ S
i ∈ S . (11)
Note that, this attack may not be unobservable to AC SE
[19], but can be converted to an unobservable AC attacks as
zai =
{
zi ,
hi(xˆ+ c) ,
i /∈ S
i ∈ S (12)
where hi(·) is the non-linear relationship between measure-
ment zi and state vector x, xˆ is the state vector that the
attacker estimated with measurements in S. The method is
first introduced in [6] and [10]. Furthermore, in our prior work
[10], [11], [17], we have demonstrated that the consequences
of the AC attacks track those of the original DC attacks.
IV. OPTIMAL LINE OVERFLOW ATTACKS WITH
LOCALIZED INFORMATION
In this section, we build upon the attack in [10] by replacing
assumptions K1 and C1 with the following limited assump-
tions on the attacker’s knowledge (K2) and capability (C2):
K2 Within a sub-network L, the attacker has perfect knowl-
edge of the topology, historical load data, generator data
including operational status, capacity, cost, and histori-
cal dispatch information, and locational marginal price
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(LMP). In particular, we assume that the attacker has
enough historical data to perform the multiple linear
regression described in the sequel. This sub-network L
is bounded by load buses.
C2 The attacker may modify measurements within an attack
sub-graph S within L, i.e., S ⊆ L.
An example attack sub-network in the IEEE 24-bus RTS
system is shown in Fig. 2.
Notation: Recall that the area outside L, where the attacker
has no knowledge, is denoted as the external network, i.e.,
E = G \ L. We define the set of boundary buses in L as B,
such that each bus in B is connected to at least one bus in E .
The set of remaining buses in L is defined as the internal bus
set I = L \ B. For any vector or matrix associated with the
entire network G such as c,G,H,K, P, PG, and PD, we write
the equivalent parameters corresponding to the sub-network
L with (¯·). For example, H¯ refers to the dependency matrix
between power injection measurements and state variables
only inside L. Sub-vectors are denoted by subscripts with the
corresponding set of elements (buses, lines, or generators).
Sub-matrices are denoted with a subscript giving the set of
rows, and a superscript giving the set of columns.
A. System Power Flow with Localized Information
According to assumption K2, the attacker only has knowl-
edge inside L. Therefore, the attacker cannot calculate the
line power flow inside L with (4) since both the PTDF matrix
K of the network G and the subset of power injections in
external network E are unavailable to attacker. To form the
line power flow with K2, we introduce a vector of pseudo-
boundary injection P¯I,B. The ith entry of P¯I,B, namely P¯I,i,
corresponding to boundary bus i, represents the sum of power
flows delivered from L to E at boundary bus i, i ∈ B, as
P¯I,i =
∑
k∈WEi
Pk (13)
where WEi represents the lines located in E that are connected
to boundary bus i.
Using (13), the vector of line power flows in L can be
written as
P¯ = K¯I(G¯IP¯G− P¯D,I) + K¯B(G¯BP¯G− P¯D,B− P¯I,B) (14)
where K¯ is split into column-wise sub-matrices K¯I and K¯B,
and G¯ is split into row-wise sub-matrices G¯I and G¯B, both
corresponding to buses in I and B, respectively. This equation
can be further simplified as
P¯ = K¯(G¯P¯G − P¯D)− K¯BP¯I,B. (15)
B. Multiple Linear Regression
The optimal line overflow attack introduced in Sec. III-A
involves determining the attack vector in the first level and
estimating the system response to the attack via the whole
system DC OPF in the second level. However, due to limited
knowledge, the attacker must predict the response of the OPF
using only local knowledge. The OPF may be reformulated
to include power balance, thermal limit, and generation limit
constraints only in L, and apply (15) to capture all effects in
the external network through the pseudo-boundary injections
P¯I,B. However, with this formulation, the attacker still cannot
predict how the attack affects P¯I,B since it depends on both
power injections in L and E . Therefore, before the attack is
executed, the attacker cannot estimate the system re-dispatch
after the attack accurately.
If the attacker can obtain a large amount of historical
power injections and pseudo-boundary injections data in L
(for example, by observing the system over a long time), it
can learn a functional relationship between pseudo-boundary
injection, P¯I,B, and power injections inside L. The attacker can
then predict the pseudo-boundary injections with the power
injection in L as
ˆ¯PI,B = Fˆ
(
G¯P¯G − P¯D
)
+ fˆ0 (16)
where [fˆ0 Fˆ ] represent an affine relationship, and ˆ¯PI,B is
the attacker’s prediction of pseudo-boundary injection by
capturing the functional relationship via a linear model. Note
that the historical pseudo-boundary injections can be computed
with data in L as
P¯I,i =
∑
g∈Gi
P¯G,g − P¯D,i −
∑
k∈WLi
P¯k (17)
where Gi is the set of generators connected to bus i, and WLi
is the set of lines in L that connected to bus i. We suppose
the attacker uses multiple linear regression to learn [fˆ0 Fˆ ].
Multiple linear regression is a statistical method to find a
linear relationship between multiple inputs and single output
[20]. Take boundary bus i for an example. Let the output yi =
P¯I,i and inputs xT = G¯P¯G − P¯D. At one instance of time t,
yi,t satisfies
yi,t =
[
x1,t x2,t . . . xk,t
]

fi,1
fi,2
...
fi,k
+ fi,0 + εi,t (18)
where fi,j , j = 0, ..., k, are regression coefficients for bound-
ary bus i, and εi,t is random error. In the following, we let
Fˆi = [fi,1 fi,2 ... fi,k] be the coefficient vector for boundary
bus i.
Consider a problem with an m× 1 observed output vector
yi, and an m × k + 1 input matrix X = [1 x1 ... xk]. The
relationship in (18) can be written in matrix notation as
yi = X
[
fˆi,0 Fˆi
]T
+ εi. (19)
Least squares estimation (LSE) can be used to estimate the
regression coefficients Fˆi in (19) as
[fˆi,0 Fˆi]
T =
(
XTX
)−1
XTyi. (20)
Note that as we stated in K2, we assume the attacker has
enough historical data. Therefore,
(
XTX
)
is full-rank. We
repeatedly use this process to obtain [fˆi,0 Fˆi] for each i, i ∈ B.
Thus, the attacker can use historical data to obtain the estimate
Fˆ , such that [fˆ0 Fˆ ] = [fˆi,0 Fˆi], ∀i ∈ B. The dimension of
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[fˆ0 Fˆ ] is nB × (k + 1), where nB is the number of boundary
buses. The attacker now can approximate (15) as
P¯ = K¯
(
G¯P¯G − P¯D
)− K¯B (Fˆ (G¯P¯G − P¯D)+ fˆ0) . (21)
In the following subsection, (21) is used to evaluate the
vulnerability to attacker with limited information.
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Fig. 2. IEEE 24-bus RTS system decomposed into attack sub-network and
attack external network.
C. Attack Optimization Problem under Localized Information
In this section, we introduce a bi-level attack optimization
problem to formulate the limited information attack. The first
level determines the attack vector in L that maximize target
line flow and the second level represents system re-dispatch
after attack via DC OPF formulated with only information
in L. However, since the attacker does not have knowledge
of either the topology or the generator information in E ,
we assume that the attacker only minimizes the total cost
of generation in L and approximates the effect of the total
generation cost in E as the total cost of the pseudo-boundary
injections in the second level modified OPF. For boundary bus
i, this cost is estimated as the product of the LMP, λi, and the
pseudo-boundary injection at bus i. The limited information
bi-level attack optimization problem is as follows:
maximize
c¯,P¯
P¯l − ζ ‖c¯‖0 (22)
subject to
P¯ = K¯
(
G¯P¯ ∗G − P¯D
)− K¯BP¯ ∗I,B (23)
‖c¯‖0 ≤ N0, c¯B = 0 (24)
− τP¯D ≤ H¯c¯ ≤ τP¯D (25){
P¯ ∗G, P¯
∗
I,B
}
= arg
minimizeP¯G,P¯I,B ∑g∈LCg
(
P¯Gg
)
+
∑
i∈B
λiP¯I,i

(26)
subject to
P¯I,B = Fˆ
(
G¯P¯G − P¯D + H¯c¯
)
+ fˆ0 (27)∑
g∈L
P¯G,g −
∑
i∈B
P¯I,i =
∑
i∈L
P¯D,i (28)
− P¯max ≤ K¯
(
G¯P¯G − P¯D + H¯c¯
)− K¯BP¯I,B ≤ P¯max (29)
P¯G,min ≤ P¯G ≤ P¯G,max (30)
where (26) captures the modified OPF objective as the
first term represents the total cost of generation in L and
the second term is the total cost of pseudo-boundary in-
jections. Constraint (27) represents the attacker’s prediction
of the pseudo-boundary injection after attack resulting from
the counterfeit loads. Note that, in the cyber system (OPF
with attack vector), the power injections in L is G¯P¯G −
P¯D + H¯c¯, thus, the corresponding pseudo-boundary injec-
tion should respond to these injections with attack. In (29),
we directly write the second term with KBP¯I,B instead
of KB
(
Fˆ
(
G¯P¯G − P¯D + H¯c
)
+ fˆ0
)
. In addition, we have
changed the constraint on the attack vector in (24) to limit
the attack to be within the sub-network L.
As with the bi-level optimization problem for perfect infor-
mation, (22)−(30) is non-linear and non-convex. We employ
the same modifications as detailed in Sec. III-A to convert it
into a MILP.
Note that attacker can only overload lines in L. The attack
optimization problem ensures that only measurements inside L
can be changed by attacker. The post-attack system re-dispatch
(OPF), on the other side, forces all the cyber line power flows
within the thermal limits. Therefore, the attacker can only hide
the physical overflow inside L with FDI attack.
V. JUSTIFICATION OF THE LOCALIZED INFORMATION FDI
ATTACKS
In this section, we make a distinction between the physical
system, as it actually exists, and the cyber system, as seen by
the control center, which may differ from the physical system
due to the FDI attack. We use the superscripts p and c to
denote the physical and cyber power flows, respectively. Due
to limited information, the attacker can only use data in L to
compute the physical and cyber power flows which may be dif-
ferent from the actual values. Therefore, we refer the physical
and cyber power flows computed by the attacker as attacker-
computed physical and cyber power flows, respectively.
We prove that: (i) there exists a linear relationship F
between pseudo-boundary injection and power injections in
L under certain circumstances; and (ii) even if Fˆ does not
accurately predict the system response after attack, the attacker
can still compute an upper bound on the physical power flow
with limited information.
The following assumptions are made about the historical
data available to the attacker: (i) the topology for all the
historical data remains the same, (ii) each instance of historical
data satisfies OPF, and (iii) there exists a subset of buses
Z in E , for which power injections remain constant in the
historical data. The subset of remaining buses in E is denoted
as Y = E \ Z . In our prior work [10], [11], [17], [21], we
have shown that congested lines are more vulnerable to line
overflow FDI attacks. Analogously, in this work, we assume
the target line is congested.
A. Validation of Multiple Linear Regression Method
In this subsection, we prove the existence of linear relation-
ship between pseudo-boundary injections and power injections
in L under certain circumstances.
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For simplicity, we define the set of lines in the network
G that are the congested for each instance of historical data
as C, where C+ and C− are the subsets in C for which the
power flow directions are positive and negative, respectively.
We assume there are nc congested lines in C, nL, nE , and nY
buses in L, E , and Y , respectively.
In order to evaluate the performance of the coefficient
matrix Fˆ , we define a matrix B = [KYC ; 1
T ], where KYC is
the sub-matrix of K whose rows correspond to the congested
lines in C and columns correspond to the buses in Y .
Theorem 1. The coefficient matrix Fˆ perfectly predicts the
pseudo-boundary injections with power injections in L linearly
if and only if B is full column rank.
Proof. We denote the vector of power injections in G as v; that
is v = GPG − PD; the vectors vL, vE , vY , and vZ represent
the subsets of v corresponding to buses in L, E , Y , and Z ,
respectively. We define Wi as the set of lines connecting to
boundary bus i, i ∈ B, where WLi and WEi are the subsets
of lines located in L and E , respectively. We define a vector
Ji as the sum of row vectors in K corresponding to lines
in WEi ; that is Ji =
∑
k∈WEi Kk. The matrices J
L
i , J
Y
i , and
JZi are the sub-matrices of J in which the columns of the
matrices corresponding to buses in L, Y , and Z , respectively.
As introduced in Sec. IV, the pseudo-boundary injection at
bus i is a linear combination of power injections at each bus
in L, Y , and Z is given by
P¯I,i = J
L
i vL + J
Y
i vY + J
Z
i vZ . (31)
Note that vZ is a constant across all instances of historical
data. Since each instance of historical data resulted from an
converged OPF, vL and vY satisfy the following:
KLk vL +K
Y
k vY = Pk,max −KZk vZ ∀k ∈ C+ (32)
KLr vL +K
Y
r vY = −Pr,max −KZr vZ ∀r ∈ C− (33)
1T vL + 1T vY = −1T vZ (34)
where (32) and (33) are the thermal limit constraints for
congested lines in C+ and C−, respectively, and (34) is the
power balance constraint.
Equations (32)−(34) can be collected as
AvL +BvY = d. (35)
where A = [KLC ; 1
T ] and d = [SPC,max −KZC vZ ; −1T vZ ].
The matrix S is a nc × nc diagonal matrix with Skk = 1,
∀k ∈ C+, and Skk = −1, ∀k ∈ C−.
The dimensions of A and B are (nc + 1) × nL and
(nc + 1)×nY , respectively. Note that the number of columns
in B represents the total number of buses in Y .
Suppose that B is full column rank. Thus, BTB is
non-singular; that is, there exists a pseudoinverse B+ =(
BTB
)−1
BT , such that B+B = I . Therefore, applying B+
to (35), the vector vY can be rewritten as
vY = −B+AvL +B+d. (36)
The pseudo-boundary injection P¯I,i in (31) can be written as
P¯I,i =
(
JLi − JYi B+A
)
vL + JYi B
+d+ JZi vZ . (37)
Therefore, the linear coefficient Fi between P¯I,i and vL is
Fi = J
L
i − JYi B+A
fi,0 = J
Y
i B
+d+ JZi vZ .
(38)
From (38), we see that Fi is unique and is the perfect linear
predictor. The linear coefficient matrix between P¯I,B and vL
is F = [Fi], ∀i ∈ B.
Suppose that B is not full column rank. Thus there exist in-
finitely many of vY satisfying (35), i.e., vY cannot be uniquely
determined by vL. Therefore, the multiple linear regression
will not perfectly predict the pseudo-boundary injections.
In Sec. VI, we provide a test case in IEEE 24-bus system
for which B is full column rank. We demonstrate that the Fˆ
obtained with multiple linear regression method does indeed
lead to perfect prediction of P¯I,B. We also provide three
counter examples (one in IEEE 24-bus system and the others in
IEEE 118-bus system). For these illustrated counter-examples,
B satisfies (nc + 1) < nY , which indicates that B is not
full column rank. However, even for a case with B satisfying
(nc + 1) ≥ nY , B cannot be assumed to be full column rank.
An example is a system with 3 buses in Y and 2 parallel
congested lines. For this system, rank
(
KYC
)
= 1 since the row
vectors in K for the parallel lines are the same. The matrix
B, hence, is not a full rank matrix since rank (B) ≤ 2 and by
Theorem 1, Fˆ cannot result in an accurate prediction.
Note that B does not determine the feasibility of the limited
information FDI attacks. In fact, B only determines whether
P¯I,B can be perfectly predicted by vL or not. However, that
does not mean that when B is not full column rank, such
attacks are infeasible. The matrix B which is not full column
rank may undermine the attacker’s evaluation of the attack
consequences via the bi-level attack optimization problem. But
the attacker can still find attack vector c¯∗ and design the attack.
B. Upper Bound on Physical Consequences of Attack
Although Fˆ in general cannot accurately predict P¯I,B when
B is not full column rank, the attacker can still utilize Fˆ in
the bi-level attack optimization problem (22)−(30) to predict
the physical power flow on target line. However, the attacker-
computed physical power flow may not match the physical
power flow. The following theorem shows that even so, the
attacker can compute an upper bound Publ on the physical
power flow on the target line subsequent to an attack.
Theorem 2. The physical power flow on the target line l
resulting from attack vector c¯∗ is upper bounded by
P ubl = Pl,max − K¯lH¯c¯∗. (39)
Proof. Solving the attack optimization problem (22)−(30), the
attacker can obtain the optimal attack vector c¯∗. The resulting
attack vector for the whole system is c∗, where c∗i = c¯
∗
i for
i ∈ L and c∗i = 0 for i ∈ E . Injecting c∗ in the system
will result in a system re-dispatch determined by (7)−(10).
The difference between the physical and cyber power flows
(P pl and P
c
l , respectively) on target line l after the post-attack
system re-dispatch is
P pl − P cl = −KlHc∗. (40)
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Thus, the physical power flow on target line l satisfies
P pl = P
c
l −KlHc∗ ≤ Pl,max −KlHc∗. (41)
where the upper bound follows from the thermal limit con-
straint on P cl in (9). Note that Kl and H are unknown to the
attacker with limited information. However, the attacker has
the knowledge of K¯l and H¯ . We now show that the upper
bound in (41) is equivalent to P ubl defined in (39).
The PTDF matrices K¯ and K satisfy the following
K¯ = Γ¯H¯+ (42)
K = ΓH+ (43)
where Γ and Γ¯ are the dependency matrices between power
flow measurements and voltage angle states in G and L,
respectively, H+ and H¯+ are the pseudoinverse of H and
H¯ , respectively. Note that for target line l, both Γl and Γ¯l
have only two non-zero elements corresponding to the two
end buses of l (denoted as buses lf and lt, respectively). In
particular, Γlfl = Γ¯
lf
l = −Γltl = −Γ¯ltl = 1xl , where xl is the
line impedance of line l. Thus,
K¯lH¯c¯
∗ = Γ¯lc¯∗ = Γlc∗ = KlHc. (44)
Therefore, the right-hand side of (41) is exactly equal to P ubl .
This proves the upper bound in (39). Moreover, P ubl can be
computed by the attacker, since it requires knowledge only of
the local network L and the attack vector c¯∗.
Note that from (23) and (29), the attacker can compute the
difference between the physical and cyber power flows on
target line l (P¯ pl and P¯
c
l , respectively) solved with limited
information attack optimization as
P¯ pl − P¯ cl = −K¯lH¯c¯∗. (45)
Thus, the difference between physical and cyber power flows
seen by the attacker and the system are the same
P¯ pl − P¯ cl = P pl − P cl . (46)
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we illustrate the efficacy of the attacks
designed with the method proposed in Sec. IV. To this end,
we first compute the coefficient matrix with historical data
using the multiple linear regression method. Subsequently,
we solve the optimization problem to find the optimal attack
vector c¯∗ inside L. Finally, we test the physical consequences
of the attack vector c¯∗ on the entire network G. The test
systems include the IEEE 24-bus reliability test system (RTS)
and the IEEE 118-bus system from MATPOWER v4.1. In
particular, the line rating data for IEEE 118-bus system is
adopted from [?]. The whole network DC OPF and limited
information attack algorithm is implemented with Matlab. The
optimization problem is solved with CPLEX.
To model realistic power systems, we assume that there are
congested lines prior to the attack and the attacker chooses one
of them in L as the target to maximize power flow. This is
achieved in simulation by uniformly reducing all line ratings
by 50% for IEEE 24-bus RTS and 45% for IEEE 118-bus
system.
We illustrate our results for the following choice of param-
eters: the weight of the l1-norm of attack vector in (22), ζ, is
set to 1% of the original power flow value of the target line;
and the load shift factor in (25), τ , is set to 10%. We assume
that the attacker can obtain 200 instances of historical data
inside L.
We focus on two scenarios for the historical data:
• Scenario 1 - Constant Loads in E: In each instance of
data, loads in E remain unchanged while loads in L varies
as a percent p of the base load, where p is independent
N (0, 10%). That is, power injections vary only at buses
with marginal generators (denoted EM ). Therefore, in this
scenario, the set Y introduced in Sec. V is given by Y =
EM . The number of buses in EM is denoted by nEM
• Scenario 2 - Varying Loads in the entire network G:
In each instance of data, loads in both L and E vary as a
percent p of the base load, with p chosen independently
for each load as N (0, 10%). In this scenario, power
injections at all buses in E vary in the historical data,
i.e., Y = E .
Note that the data in both scenarios also satisfy the following
assumptions: (i) the topology for all the historical data remains
the same, (ii) the historical generation dispatches data in both
scenarios satisfies OPF, and (iii) there exists a subset of buses
Z in E , for which power injections remain constant in the
historical data. An example of attack is that an attacker hacks
into the system and collects the data from 12:00 p.m. to 2:00
p.m. for the entire month of July and then launches a FDI
attack at the end of the month.
A. Results for IEEE 24-Bus RTS System
In this subsection, we present attack consequences on the
IEEE 24-bus RTS system for Scenarios 1 and 2. The sub-
network L is illustrated in Fig. 2. In each scenario, we
compare the attack consequences on target line 28 determined
by the optimization problems for two cases: (i) complete
system knowledge as in [10] (identified as global case), and
(ii) limited system knowledge (henceforth identified as local
case). For local case, we compare the physical power flow
P pl and the attacker-computed physical power flow P¯
p
l . The
results of attacks are illustrated in Fig. 3. We illustrate the
difference between the physical and the attacker-computed
pseudo-boundary injections in Fig. 4.
In Figs. 3(a) and (b), we note that the solutions for the
local case is sub-optimal relative to that for the global case.
The reason is that as N1 is relaxed, getting a larger overflow
on the target line requires measurements in both L and E to be
modified. Therefore, the constraint on limited attack resources
prevents any further increase in the maximal target line flow
for the local case.
The parameters of the test system are summarized in Table
I. The historical data in Scenario 1 satisfies rank(B) = nEM .
Thus, by Theorem 1, the pseudo-boundary power injections are
perfectly predicted by the multiple linear regression method,
which explains why the attacker-computed system response
post-attack is the same as the actual response, as illustrated in
Figs. 3(a) and 4(a).
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Table I
SUMMARY OF THE TEST SYSTEMS
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Test System # of CongestedLines (nc)
# of Buses in
EM (nEM )
rank(B) # of CongestedLines (nc)
# of Buses
in E (nE ) rank(B)
24-bus 2 2 2 2 16 3
118-bus 3 5 4 3 71 4
0 . 0 0 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 8 0 . 1 01 0 0
1 0 5
1 1 0
0 . 0 0 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 8 0 . 1 01 0 0
1 0 5
1 1 0
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Fig. 3. The maximum power flow (PF) v.s. the l1-norm constraint (N1) when
target line is 28 of IEEE 24-bus system for (a) Scenario 1, and (b) Scenario
2 historical data.
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Fig. 4. The pseudo-boundary power injection error v.s. the l1-norm constraint
(N1) when target line is 28 of IEEE 24-bus system for (a) Scenario 1, and
(b) Scenario 2 historical data.
Furthermore, Table I shows that for the historical data
in Scenario 2, rank(B) < nE . Thus, by Theorem 1, the
predictions of pseudo-boundary injections by the multiple
linear regression are not accurate and there will be mismatches
between the actual and the attacker-computed system response
post-attack. This is verified by the non-zero pseudo-boundary
power injection differences shown in Fig. 4(b). In Fig. 3(b),
in addition to plotting the attacker-computed physical power
flow, we also plot the upper bound on physical power flow.
From Fig. 3(b), we observe that although there are mismatches
between the actual and attacker-computed system response
under attack, the upper bound found in Sec. V-B exactly
matches the physical power flow.
B. Results for IEEE 118-Bus System
In this subsection, we test the consequences of attacks on the
IEEE 118-bus system. The details of sub-network L are listed
in Table II. The results of attacks designed with historical data
in Scenarios 1 and 2 are illustrated in Fig. 5 with sub-plots (a)
and (b), respectively. The difference between the physical and
the attacker-computed pseudo-boundary injections at 3 of 18
boundary buses, buses 23, 70, and 80, for both scenarios are
illustrated in Fig. 6 with sub-plots (a) and (b), respectively.
The parameters of the test system are also summarized in
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Fig. 5. The maximum power flow (PF) v.s. the l1-norm constraint (N1) when
target line is 5 of IEEE 118-bus system for (a) Scenario 1, and (b) Scenario
2 historical data.
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Fig. 6. The pseudo-boundary power injection error v.s. the l1-norm constraint
(N1) when target line is 5 of IEEE 118-bus system for (a) Scenario 1, and
(b) Scenario 2 historical data.
Table I. Note that for historical data in both scenarios, B
does not have full column rank. Therefore, Theorem 1 predicts
a mismatch between physical and attacker-computed pseudo-
boundary injections. This is verified by Fig. 6, which shows
the pseudo-boundary injection error. In Figs. 5(a) and (b),
we find that in both scenarios, both the attacker-computed
physical power flow and the upper bound match the physical
power flow. This case demonstrates that even though there are
mismatches between physical and attacker-computed pseudo-
boundary injections, the attacker-computed physical power
flow can still be correct. Note that, in this case, both the cyber
power flow and the attacker-computed cyber power flow reach
the limit post-attack since the target line is congested before
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attack. Therefore, from (46), the attacker-computed physical
power flow is the same as the physical power flow.
Table II
SUMMARY OF THE ATTACK SUB-NETWORK IN IEEE 118-BUS SYSTEM
Buses 1-14, 16, 17, 23, 25-27, 30, 33-35, 37-40, 47, 49, 59-66,
68-70, 75, 77, 80, 81, 116, 117
Lines 1-17, 20, 22, 31-33, 36-38, 47, 48, 50-55, 65, 88-100, 102,
104-108, 115, 116, 119, 120, 123, 124, 126, 127, 183, 184
Boundary
Buses
13, 14, 17, 23, 27, 33-35, 40, 47, 49, 59, 62, 66, 70, 75,
77, 80
C. Attack Sensitivity to Topology Change
In this subsection, we evaluate the efficacy of attacks
generated from historical data with topologies that are different
from the real-time topology. We assume that the attacker uses
the historical datasets in Secs. VI-A and VI-B to compute
the coefficient matrices, and is not aware of a line outage in
E in real-time. We exhaustively test the consequences of the
attacks designed with the computed coefficient matrices on all
possible real-time topologies with one line outage in E . Note
that the topology changes that will result in infeasible pre-
attack DC OPF solution are not considered here. The l1-norm
constraints (N1) are chosen as 0.05 and 0.4 for the IEEE 24-
bus and 118-bus systems, respectively. We compare the results
with those in Secs. VI-A and VI-B and summarize them in
Table. III. Note that for the pseudo-boundary power injection
errors, we compare the l2-norm of the errors on all boundary
buses for each test case since there are multiple boundary buses
in the test system. From the table, we can observe that if the
attacker uses the coefficient matrix computed from historical
data with different topology to design attacks, its evaluation
of attack consequences may be undermined. Specifically for
the case with Scenario 1 historical data in the IEEE 24-
bus system, the attacker cannot obtain perfect prediction
on pseudo-boundary injections any more since the real-time
topology differs from that in the historical data. However, for
most of the test cases, i.e., 86.47% and 98.26% cases for the
IEEE 24-bus and 118-bus systems, respectively, the attacker
can still cause line overflow with the inaccurate coefficient
matrices.
D. Verification on AC Power Flow Model
In this subsection, we test the performance of the proposed
attack strategies on AC power flow model. We first compare
the attack consequences of the DC attacks in Secs. VI-A and
VI-B and the corresponding AC attacks in Fig. 7. The AC
attacks are computed with the designed DC attack vector c
which satisfy (12). The system re-dispatch in response to each
AC attack is via AC OPF. This figure validates that although
the attack vector is solved by a linear optimization problem, it
can still cause overflows in the AC system and the AC attack
consequences track those of the original DC attacks.
In addition, the impact of AC power flow historical data on
the attack consequences are studied. We randomly generate a
historical dataset, in which each instance is based on AC power
Table III
SUMMARY OF THE SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS UNDER DIFFERENT
TOPOLOGIES
Test System
& Scenario
# of Total
Test
Cases
% of Cases
with
Physical
Overflow
Decreases
% of Cases
without
Physical
Overflow
% of Cases
with
Prediction
Error
Increases
24-bus SC1 22 18.18% 13.63% 100%
24-bus SC2 22 9.1% 13.63% 90.91%
118-bus SC1 115 0 0 63.48%
118-bus SC2 115 0 1.74% 10.43%
SC: Scenario
0 . 0 0 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 8 0 . 1 01 0 0
1 0 2
1 0 4
1 0 6
0 . 0 0 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 8 0 . 1 01 0 0
1 0 2
1 0 4
1 0 6
                                          D C  A t t a c k  P h y s i c a l  P l
 A C  A t t a c k  P h y s i c a l  S l     A C  A t t a c k  P h y s i c a l  P l
                                          D C  A t t a c k  P h y s i c a l  P l
 A C  A t t a c k  P h y s i c a l  S l     A C  A t t a c k  P h y s i c a l  P l
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Fig. 7. Comparison of the maximum power flow of DC and AC attacks.
flow model and satisfies all assumptions in Scenario 2. That is,
the topology in each instance of historical data is the same with
the real-time topology. We then compute the coefficient matrix,
solve the optimization problem to find the optimal attack,
and test the physical consequences of the attack. The l1-norm
constraints (N1) are chosen as 0.05 and 0.4 for the IEEE 24-
bus and 118-bus systems, respectively. We repeat this process
100 times and illustrate the results in Table IV. From this table,
it can be seen that historical datasets with AC power flow data
can reduce the prediction accuracy of the pseudo-boundary
injections and the target line physical power flow. However,
for both test systems, 100% of the designed attacks can result
in physical target line overflows. These results demonstrate the
robustness of the proposed attack strategy on AC power flow
model.
Table IV
SUMMARY OF THE SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS UNDER AC POWER
FLOW HISTORICAL DATASETS
Test
System
% of Cases
with
Physical
Overflow
% of Cases
without
Physical
Overflow
Decreases
% of Cases
with
Prediction
Error
Increases
24-bus 100% 93% 46%
118-bus 100% 0 100%
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the physical system conse-
quences of a class of unobservable limited information FDI
attacks. We assume the attacker can design the attacks using
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historical data including topology, generation dispatch and
load information only inside an attack sub-network L and can
modify measurements within an attack sub-graph S inside L
with counterfeits. The attacks are designed based on DC power
flow model. We have introduced pseudo-boundary injections to
represent the power flows delivered from the external network
and developed a multiple linear regression model for the
attacker to learn the relationship between pseudo-boundary
injections and the power injections inside the attack sub-
network. We have formulated a bi-level optimization problem
to maximize the power flow on a chosen target line with
attacker’s perfect information in the attack sub-network as
well as the predicted pseudo-boundary injections. Our results
illustrate that the attacker can overload transmission lines
with the proposed bi-level attack optimization problems. In
conclusion, one must be concerned that even with limited
information, an attacker with access to historical data can take
advantage of it to the detriment of reliable system operations.
Future work will include (a) employing the attack optimiza-
tion structure to achieve other attack consequences such as
maximizing total operation costs, load shedding, or physical
interface power flow that can result in voltage collapse, (b)
performing detailed sensitivity analysis of this method with
different scenarios of historical data, (c) extending this work to
analyze the vulnerability of limited information cyber-physical
topology-and-state attacks as introduced in our prior work
[11], and (d) designing detection mechanisms to identify both
the critical sub-graphs that are the most vulnerable to FDI
attacks and anomalies inside these sub-graphs with machine
learning algorithms.
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